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DEFERENCE TO THE RULEMAKER, NOT 
TO THE RULE: THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S 
ENABLING REJECTION OF THE SEC’S 
FIXED INDEXED ANNUITIES RULE IN 
AMERICAN EQUITY INVESTMENT LIFE 
INSURANCE CO. V. SEC 
Abstract: On July 12, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit, in American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, va-
cated the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 151A due to flaws in 
the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis. Rule 151A aimed to expand the SEC’s over-
sight to include purportedly “risky” hybrid annuity products—known as 
fixed indexed annuities—currently regulated by state insurance commis-
sioners. In vacating the rule, however, the court actually embraced an ex-
pansive view of a federal agency’s authority to regulate in an area histori-
cally reserved to the states. This Comment argues that courts should avoid 
such broad deference when evaluating federal agency rules that threaten to 
encroach upon an area presumptively occupied by state regulation. 
Introduction 
 Since the federal securities laws went into effect in 1933, courts 
have often struggled with the proper application of investor protections 
to a rapidly changing financial services industry.1 Annuity contracts 
have been an especially frequent source of uncertainty for courts.2 As 
consumers have grown increasingly wary of the devastating effects of 
inflation on retirement savings, insurers have responded by developing 
innovative products that combine a traditional annuity structure with 
potentially riskier, and thus more rewarding, investment features.3 The-
                                                                                                                      
1 See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws?, 56 Alb. L. Rev. 473 (1993) (illustrating the difficulty that courts have 
had determining when a financial product is a “security”). 
2 See id. at 495–500. Compare SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 212 
(1967) (reading certain annuity contracts as securities), and SEC v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 73 (1959) (same), with Malone v. Addison Ins. Mktg. Inc, 
225 F. Supp. 2d 743, 751 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (reading fixed indexed annuities as insurance 
contracts). 
3 See United Benefit, 387 U.S. at 204 (recognizing that hybrid annuities are “a recent ef-
fort to meet the challenge of inflation by allowing the purchaser to reap the benefits of a 
professional investment program while gaining the security of an insurance annuity”). 
197 
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se hybrid products aim to combine the safety of an annuity with the 
long-term capital growth typically associated with equity exposure.4 
 Hybrid annuities are particularly vexing for courts because they 
straddle the boundary between state and federal regulatory authority.5 
Annuities are regulated by the various state insurance commissioners, 
who restrict the fees and commissions that insurers may charge, the 
investment activities they may undertake, and the representations they 
may make to prospective customers.6 The SEC, however, is charged 
with protecting investors in securities from fraud and other deceptive 
sales practices and may seek to regulate hybrid products that pose un-
usual levels of risk.7 For this reason, a court called upon to determine 
whether a state-regulated annuity is risky enough to warrant federal 
oversight must confront difficult and sensitive questions regarding the 
“respective spheres of operation of federal and state law.”8 
 In 2010, in American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. v. SEC, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the 
SEC’s attempt to regulate one such hybrid product, known as a fixed 
indexed annuity (“FIA”).9 The D.C. Circuit’s decision was widely viewed 
as a victory for state insurance commissioners, who had taken the lead 
in regulating FIAs and had brought suit to protect their jurisdictions 
from federal encroachment.10 One commentator even praised the 
court for attempting to put an end to the SEC’s “overreaching,” and 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. 
5 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 1, at 495–500 (discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s efforts to classify hybrid annuities in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. at 
69, and SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. at 209). 
6 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 175, § 144A1/2 (2010); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 10, 
§ 2547.1–.11 (2010). 
7 See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 1, at 534–39 (illustrating that “the presence or 
absence of a meaningful degree of investment risk that rests with the purchaser” of a fi-
nancial product is critical to determining whether the product is a “security”); The Investor’s 
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital For-
mation, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
8 Henry M. Hart & Herbert Wechsler, Preface to the First Edition of Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr. et Al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, at vi 
(6th ed. 2009). See generally United Benefit, 387 U.S. 202 (examining the status of state-
regulated Flexible Fund Annuity contracts under the federal securities laws); VALIC, 359 
U.S. 65 (examining the status of state-regulated variable annuity contracts under the fed-
eral securities laws). 
9 613 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
10 See, e.g., Editorial, The SEC’s Annuity Smackdown, Wall St. J., July 22, 2010, at A18. 
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portrayed the decision as an example of the robust judicial review 
needed to keep federal agencies in check.11 
 Those who worry about the ever-growing power of federal adminis-
trative agencies are unlikely to be entirely satisfied with the American Eq-
uity decision.12 Although the D.C. Circuit ultimately vacated the SEC’s 
rule applying the securities laws to FIAs, it endorsed an expansive view 
of a federal agency’s authority to regulate in an area historically reserved 
to the states.13 Writing for a unanimous panel, Chief Judge David B. 
Sentelle concluded that the existing regulation of FIAs by state insur-
ance commissioners did not bar the SEC from further regulating those 
products.14 The court’s opinion suggests that the SEC may apply the 
securities laws to any annuity that it deems sufficiently risky and thus 
may establish the limits of its own regulatory authority in the process.15 
For this reason, the court accepted the SEC’s conclusion that FIAs ex-
pose annuity holders to “investment risk” and therefore require federal 
oversight.16 
 In short, the court deferred to the SEC’s rule, even though the 
rule threatened to upset the existing balance of federal and state power 
in the regulation of hybrid products.17 Yet the court showed little or no 
deference in requiring the agency to justify its encroachment on state 
regulation by providing a convincing cost-benefit analysis.18 This Com-
ment examines the court’s decision and suggests that an even less def-
erential approach is needed to prevent federal agencies from encroach-
g o
unique treatment of the SEC’s authority to regulate FIAs and its choice 
                                                                                                                     
in n areas of traditional state regulation.19 
 This Comment begins in Part I with a brief overview of FIAs and 
their regulation by state and federal authorities.20 Part II discusses the 
practice of judicial deference to administrative interpretations of law, 
including rules issued by federal agencies such as the SEC.21 It then 
discusses the D.C. Circuit’s decision in American Equity, including its 
 
11 See id. 
12 See, e.g., Christina Flanagan, Comment, The SEC’s Overreach: Against Rule 151A, 78 U. 
Cin. L. Rev. 1573, 1574–75 (2010) (discussing the federalism and “dual-sovereignty” impli-
cations of the SEC’s attempt to apply the federal securities laws to FIAs). 
13 See American Equity, 613 F.3d at 167–68. 
14 See id. at 173. 
15 See id. at 174. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. at 174. 
18 See id. at 177. 
19 See infra notes 75–137 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 24–55 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
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to vacate Rule 151A due to flaws in the SEC’s cost-benefit analysis.22 
Finally, Part III argues that courts should limit deference when federal 
agencies use statutory interpretation to encroach upon state law, and 
that the SEC should be required to provide an adequate analysis of the 
marginal costs and benefits of its efforts to regulate in areas historically 
reserved to the states.23 
I. The Regulation of Fixed Indexed Annuities 
 Fixed indexed annuities are financial products sold by life insur-
ance companies that are similar, in form and in function, to traditional 
fixed annuities.24 Like fixed annuities, FIAs have two phases: an “accu-
mulation” period and a “payout” period.25 During the accumulation 
period, the holder makes premium payments to the insurer and is cred-
ited interest thereon.26 Moreover, his investment is guaranteed never to 
fall below a minimum value established by state law.27 The guaranteed 
minimum value of the contract is typically set at 87.5% of premiums, 
adjusted upwards at a rate of 1% to 3% per year.28 During the payout 
period, the insurer distributes the accumulated funds to the holder 
through a stream of payments that typically continues for the rest of the 
holder’s life.29 This payment structure protects the annuity holder from 
outliving his savings in retirement.30 
 FIAs are distinct from fixed annuities, however, because the inter-
est rate credited to the holder’s premium payments is not fixed but ra-
ther based upon the performance of an equity index, such as the S&P 
500.31 In years when the equity index rises, the holder is credited an 
interest rate derived from the index’s percentage gain.32 In years when 
the index declines, however, the holder’s funds are not debited.33 The 
holder is not credited any index-linked interest for that year, but the 
                                                                                                                      
22 See infra notes 74–107 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 108–137 and accompanying text. 
24 Opening Brief of Petitioners American Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. et al. at 6, Am. Eq-
uity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1021). 
25 Id. at 7. 
26 Id. at 6–7. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. FIA holders may choose from a variety of different payment options, includ-
ing annuitization. Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 7. 
30 Id. at 5. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 7. 
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guaranteed minimum value of his investment continues to grow at the 
rate established by state law.34 This interest rate structure allows FIA 
holders to benefit, to a limited extent, from market gains without bear-
ing the risk of market losses—that is, without shouldering any “invest-
ment risk” as that term is typically understood.35 In this manner, FIAs 
combine the guarantees that make annuities attractive with a rate of 
return that is more likely to keep up with inflation.36 
 Since FIAs were first developed in the 1990s, they have been regu-
lated by the various state insurance commissioners.37 State laws com-
prehensively regulate all aspects of the market for FIAs and provide the 
same level of protection for FIA holders that they do for other annuity 
holders.38 Moreover, FIAs have typically been considered exempt from 
federal oversight.39 Under the Securities Act of 1933, federal investor 
protections do not apply to “annuity contract[s]” regulated by the in-
surance commissioner of a state.40 The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945 
also stipulates that “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose 
of regulating the business of insurance . . . .”41 Both the 1933 Securities 
Act and the McCarran-Ferguson Act confirm the primary and historical 
role of the states in regulating insurance and annuity products.42 
 In 2008, the SEC issued Rule 151A, designed to change the status 
of FIAs under the federal securities laws.43 Rule 151A redefined the 
                                                                                                                      
 
34 Id.; see Matt Van Heuvelen, Note, Duplicative, Confusing, and Legally Inaccurate: The 
SEC’s Attempt to Regulate Fixed Indexed Annuities, 35 J. Corp. L. 663, 666 (2010). 
35 See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 5–7; Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, 
at 666. 
36 See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 5 (citing Assocs. in Adolescent 
Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co., 941 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Traditional an-
nuities in which the exact (monthly or total) amounts to be paid to the purchaser are fixed 
are not responsive to inflation.”)). 
37 See Brief of Petitioners Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs (NAIC) at 2–8, Am. Equity Inv. 
Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1021) (summarizing the many 
state statutes and regulations that apply to FIAs); Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 665. 
38 See Brief of Petitioners NAIC, supra note 37, at 2; Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra 
note 24, at 8. 
39 See Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 664. 
40 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8) (2006). 
41 Id. § 1012(b) (2006). 
42 See id. §§ 77c(a)(8), 1012(b); Brief of Petitioners NAIC, supra note 37, at 12; Flana-
gan, supra note 12, at 1573. 
43 Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138, 3138 
( Jan. 16, 2009). Section 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933 excludes from the Act’s reach 
“any” “annuity contracts” that are issued “by a corporation subject to the supervision of the 
insurance commissioner” of a state. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(8). Rule 151A redefined the term 
“annuity contract” to exclude any contract that: (1) calculates the interest payable “at or 
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term “annuity contract,” as used in the 1933 Act, such that FIAs no 
longer fit within the scope of that term.44 Consequently, the rule de-
clared that FIAs would be subject to the full range of investor protec-
tions under federal law.45 
 The SEC premised Rule 151A on the understanding that hybrid 
annuities deserve to lose their exemption from federal oversight when 
they place a significant amount of investment risk on the annuity hold-
er.46 Typically, an annuity holder pays his insurer in the present in ex-
change for a guaranteed stream of payments in the future; the insurer 
may invest the premiums, but it bears the entire risk of its investments 
because the annuity holder remains entitled to his return.47 With a hy-
brid annuity, however, the insurer allows the annuity holder to share in 
some of the gains from the invested premiums and thus passes on to 
the annuity holder some of the risk that the investments may decline in 
value.48 When a hybrid annuity shifts all, or most, of the risk from the 
insurer onto the holder, it triggers the protections of the federal securi-
ties laws.49 
 Rule 151A, however, made use of an unusual conception of invest-
ment risk to characterize the dangers involved in holding FIAs.50 Ac-
cording to the SEC, FIA holders are exposed to investment risk because 
they are likely to earn more, not less, than the guaranteed value of the 
contract.51 Rule 151A clearly equated investment risk with volatility—the 
likelihood that a financial product will yield a return that deviates from 
the norm.52 The rule failed to distinguish between “upside” risk—the 
likelihood that a product will increase in value—and “downside” risk— 
the likelihood that a product will lose value.53 Thus, the SEC character-
ized FIAs as risk-bearing products mainly because an FIA’s index-based 
                                                                                                                      
after the end of one or more specified crediting periods” based, in whole or in part, on the 
performance during the crediting period of a security, including a “group or index of 
securities;” and (2) is “more likely than not” to result in payouts that “exceed the amounts 
guaranteed under the contract.” Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Con-
tracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3149. 
44 See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3149. 
45 Id. at 3139. 
46 See id. at 3138. 
47 See id.; Annuities, U.S. Sec. & Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
annuity.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
48 See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3138. 
49 See id. 
50 See Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 677. 
51 See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3149. 
52 See id.; Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 677. 
53 See Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 677. 
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interest rate changes from year to year.54 The fact that FIAs protect 
holders against loss of principal was not considered dispositive.55 
II. Judicial Review of the SEC’s Rule 151A 
A. Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law That Threaten to 
Encroach Upon State Autonomy 
 Typically, courts evaluate interpretations of law by federal adminis-
trative agencies, such as the SEC, under the rubric established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council.56 The Chevron doctrine holds that when an agency 
interprets ambiguous terms in a statute that it has been charged with 
administering, courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation so long 
as it is reasonable.57 
 The Chevron doctrine mandates a two-step inquiry.58 Under Chev-
ron Step One, a court must determine whether the statutory term in 
question is ambiguous—that is, whether “Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”59 If Congress’s purpose is evident from 
the statutory text, the inquiry is at an end, as courts must give effect to 
Congress’s clearly manifested intent.60 If Congress has not clearly and 
unambiguously manifested its intent, however, then the court must 
proceed to Chevron Step Two.61 The court must determine whether the 
agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous term is reasonable or “per-
missible” in light of the given statutory scheme.62 If so, the agency’s in-
terpretation must stand, regardless of whether it is the court’s preferred 
construction.63 
 It is unclear, however, if an agency is entitled to Chevron deference 
when it uses statutory interpretation to expand its reach into an area 
already regulated by the states.64 To be sure, Supreme Court precedent 
                                                                                                                      
 
54 See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3138; 
Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 677. 
55 See Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. at 3138; 
Van Heuvelen, supra note 34, at 677. 
56 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
57 Id. at 843. 
58 Id. at 842–43. 
59 Id. at 842. 
60 Id. at 842–43. 
61 Id. at 843. 
62 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
63 Id. 
64 See Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State Autonomy from Federal Administrative 
Encroachment, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 45, 66–73 (2008) (illustrating how courts have withheld 
204 Boston College Law Review Vol. 52: E. Supp. 
suggests that the Chevron doctrine must be consistently and uniformly 
applied, regardless of whether an agency’s interpretation aims to change 
important public policies or even to expand the agency’s own jurisdic-
tion.65 Chevron is meant to permit agencies, rather than courts, to make 
the difficult choices arising from the implementation of federal regula-
tory schemes.66 The doctrine may fail to accomplish this important 
purpose if courts do not apply it reliably.67 
 When agency action threatens to upset the existing balance of deci-
sion-making authority between the federal government and the states, 
however, courts have at times refused to apply the Chevron doctrine.68 
This doctrinal shift suggests that some courts are wary of according 
Chevron deference when it would permit federal administrative agencies 
to preempt, displace, or encroach upon state law.69 Such far-reaching 
modifications of the statutory scheme are often considered “major ques-
tion[s]” that Congress could not have intended to delegate implicitly to 
an agency.70 
 The SEC characterized Rule 151A as an interpretation of the term 
“annuity contract” in the Securities Act of 1933, a statute that the agen-
cy was tasked with implementing.71 Nonetheless, the SEC’s rule was 
clearly designed to alter the balance of federal and state power in the 
                                                                                                                      
Chevron deference in the past when a federal agency threatens to encroach upon state 
law); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 231–47 (2006) (showing 
how courts have declined to apply the Chevron doctrine when a federal agency attempts to 
resolve major questions of policy). 
65 See, e.g., Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380–82 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“In particular, it is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to an 
agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.”). 
66 See id. (“[D]eference is appropriate because . . . Congress would naturally expect that 
the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for resolving ambiguities in its statu-
tory authority or jurisdiction.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 
Yale J. on Reg., 283, 312 (1986) (“Chevron shifts power from the courts to the agencies, 
shifting with it the site of the real battle over regulatory decisions.”). 
67 See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 193 (arguing that the inconsistent application of Chev-
ron “increase[s] . . . judicial policymaking without promoting important countervailing 
values”). 
68 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258 (2006) (refusing to apply the Chevron 
doctrine when doing so would allow a federal agency to encroach upon state law); FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (refusing to apply the 
Chevron doctrine when federal agency action addressed major questions of policy that it 
was unlikely for Congress to have intended to delegate); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 
512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (same). See generally Keller, supra note 64; Sunstein, supra note 64. 
69 See Keller, supra note 64, at 49–50. 
70 See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 193. 
71 Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts, 74 Fed. Reg. 3138, 3138 
( Jan. 16, 2009). 
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regulation of hybrid products.72 Ultimately, the level of deference ac-
corded to such a rule depends on the willingness of the court to ven-
ture outside the Chevron framework to limit the SEC’s reach into an ar-
ea historically reserved to the states.73 
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Compromise: Embracing Deference to the SEC While 
(Temporarily) Preventing Encroachment upon State Law 
 Immediately after the SEC finalized Rule 151A on January 16, 
2009, a group of insurance companies filed a petition for review in the 
D.C. Circuit.74 Shortly thereafter, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners filed a separate challenge to the rule and the two suits 
were consolidated into a single action.75 The petitioners argued that 
the SEC had exceeded its statutory authority, encroached upon the au-
tonomy of states, and failed to evaluate adequately the costs and bene-
fits of the rule.76 On July 21, 2009, the D.C. Circuit weighed in on the 
matter, remanding the rule to the SEC to permit the agency to recon-
sider its cost-benefit analysis.77 One petitioner then moved for a panel 
rehearing and, after further argument regarding the proper remedy, 
the court reissued its opinion in American Equity and vacated the rule 
on July 12, 2010.78 
 Given Rule 151A’s intrusion into an area historically occupied by 
state regulation, a crucial question in American Equity was whether the 
rule was entitled to Chevron deference.79 Federalism and “dual-sover-
eignty” could be compromised if the SEC could invoke its interpretive 
freedom under Chevron to extend its reach to FIAs, despite the states’ 
strong historical claim to preeminence in the field of annuities regula-
tion.80 The scope of judicial review thus took on heightened significance 
in American Equity.81 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Flanagan, supra note 12, at 1574. 
73 See Keller, supra note 64, at 70–81; Sunstein, supra note 64, at 193–94. 
74 See Editorial, The SEC’s Annuity Grab, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 2009, at A10. 
75 See id. 
76 See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 27. 
77 See Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2009), amended 
and superseded by 613 F.3d 166, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
78 American Equity, 613 F.3d at 179. 
79 See id. at 172. 
80 See Flanagan, supra note 12, at 1585. 
81 See American Equity, 613 F.3d at 179; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–45; Flanagan, 
supra note 12, at 1574. 
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 The D.C. Circuit held that the SEC was indeed entitled to Chevron 
deference.82 Because the SEC had explicit statutory authority to define 
the “accounting, technical, and trade” terms of the Securities Act of 
1933, the court concluded that it was required to defer to the agency’s 
rules interpreting that statute, including Rule 151A.83 Giving short 
shrift to the petitioners’ arguments that Chevron deference could not be 
invoked to “invade the jurisdiction of the states,” the court did not con-
sider alternatives to Chevron deference in light of the important struc-
tural questions implicated by Rule 151A.84 
 The court then determined that the term “annuity contract,” as 
used in the Securities Act of 1933, was ambiguous under Chevron Step 
One.85 According to the court, the 1933 Act was “at the very least silent” 
as to whether the term “annuity contract” embraces all contracts that 
may be described as annuities.86 Thus, Congress never made it abso-
lutely clear that FIAs were meant to be exempt from the securities 
la .ws
ts on the basis of investment risk allocation, as 
index-based interest rate is calculated retrospectively, based on an eq-
                                                                                                                     
87 
 Moreover, the court concluded that the Supreme Court’s seminal 
cases interpreting the 1933 Act’s exemption for annuity products, the 
1967 case SEC v. United Benefit Life Insurance Co. and the 1959 case SEC v. 
Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co. (VALIC ), were similarly ambiguous as 
to whether investor protections applied to FIAs.88 The court inter-
preted VALIC and United Benefit as establishing a fluid, case-by-case ap-
proach to evaluating new hybrid products.89 The court declined to read 
the cases as establishing any test for distinguishing between risky and 
non-risky hybrid produc
the petitioners urged.90 
 Proceeding to Chevron Step Two, the court held that the SEC acted 
reasonably in reinterpreting the term “annuity contract” so that FIAs 
no longer fit within the scope of that term.91 The court agreed with the 
SEC that FIAs closely resemble securities, especially insofar as an FIA’s 
 
82 American Equity, 613 F.3d at 172. 
83 Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006). 
84 See American Equity, 613 F.3d at 172; Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 26. 
85 American Equity, 613 F.3d at 173. 
86 Id. 
87 See id. 
88 Id. at 173; see SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 202 (1967); SEC v. 
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. (VALIC), 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959). 
89 American Equity, 613 F.3d at 173. 
90 Id.; Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 24, at 32. 
91 American Equity, 613 F.3d at 174. 
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uity index’s performance over the previous year, rather than prospec-
tively, as are most fixed interest rates.92 
 The court also concluded that the SEC’s method of gauging in-
vestment risk was reasonable, agreeing that FIA holders are exposed to 
risk because “there is variability in [an FIA’s] potential return.”93 The 
court rejected the petitioners’ argument that investment risk can only 
be understood to mean loss of principal.94 The court noted that an FIA 
promising a return between 1% and 10% is in fact “riskier” than a fixed 
annuity with a guaranteed 5% rate, although both products insure the 
holder against loss of principal.95 Therefore, the court denied that the 
SEC’s concept of investment risk was novel and “insupportable.”96 The 
SEC’s definition was at least as defensible as the petitioners’ and thus 
was entitled to deference.97 
 Despite deferring to the SEC’s interpretation of the term “annuity 
contract,” the court went on to hold that the SEC failed to meet its 
statutory obligation under section 2(b) of the 1933 Act to consider 
Rule 151A’s effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.98 
The court concluded that the SEC’s section 2(b) analysis was “arbitrary 
and capricious” and consequently vacated the rule.99 
 The SEC’s competition analysis was flawed, the court reasoned, 
because it failed to show precisely how federal regulation would enhance 
competition beyond the levels already existing under state law.100 The 
SEC argued that the fuller public disclosure and increased price trans-
parency mandated by the securities laws would likely increase competi-
tion.101 The court was unconvinced, however, because the SEC failed to 
assess the “baseline level of price transparency and information disclo-
sure under state law.”102 Without such an inquiry, no account of the 
marginal benefits of federal regulation could be provided.103 
 The court concluded that the SEC’s efficiency and capital forma-
tion analyses were similarly flawed.104 The SEC argued that the applica-
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tion of federal investor protections to FIAs, including disclosure and 
sales practice requirements, would allow investors to make better deci-
sions and thereby lead to more efficient markets and increased capital 
formation.105 The SEC failed to show, however, that the proposed 
measures would be more effective than existing state laws in assisting 
investors to make wise and informed decisions.106 Because the SEC did 
not inquire into the efficiency, or lack thereof, of the existing state law 
regime, the court refused to accept the SEC’s claim that Rule 151A 
would increase efficiency or capital formation.107 
III. A Missed Opportunity to Protect State Autonomy from 
Federal Administrative Encroachment? 
 By permitting the SEC to invoke Chevron deference for Rule 151A, 
the D.C. Circuit in American Equity diminished the judiciary’s important 
role in preventing federal agencies from surreptitiously encroaching on 
powers historically reserved to the states.108 The SEC’s redefinition of 
investment risk enlarged the agency’s jurisdiction and impermissibly 
redrew the “boundaries between federal and state regulatory pro-
grams.”109 A less deferential approach by the court would have more 
effectively honored Congress’s intent and guarded states’ autonomy.110 
 First, the court’s Chevron analysis should have hewed much more 
closely to statutory text.111 Under Chevron Step One, the court read 
ambiguity into the Securities Act of 1933 where none existed.112 As the 
petitioners convincingly argued, the plain meaning of the 1933 Act in-
dicates that FIAs should be exempt from federal oversight.113 The stat-
ute excludes from its reach “any . . . annuity contract” that is regulated 
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by the insurance commissioner of a state.114 The statutory text is broad 
enough to encompass FIAs, as well as any other state-regulated hybrid 
product that retains a basic annuity structure.115 
 Under Chevron Step Two, the court erred in assuming that any in-
terpretation of the term “annuity contract” based on a defensible con-
cept of investment risk is worthy of deference.116 Although there are 
surely several different ways to understand investment risk, it does not 
follow that the statute authorizes the SEC to pick any of them.117 If it 
did, the SEC could extend its reach to just about any annuity product, 
either hybrid or traditional.118 
 The American Equity court’s analysis confirms that the Chevron doc-
trine does not make sense when divorced from a traditional, “plain 
meaning” approach to statutory interpretation.119 Non-textualist ap-
proaches to statutory interpretation, combined with Chevron deference, 
tend to concentrate power in administrative agencies and produce sig-
nificant dislocations of authority.120 
 Second, the court need not have employed the Chevron doctrine at 
all.121 Rather, the court could have drawn from recent criticism suggest-
ing that judicial deference should be limited when federal agencies 
threaten to encroach upon state law.122 Such an approach could help to 
fill a void in the doctrinal foundations of Chevron.123 Though deference 
is said to be warranted because ambiguous statutes implicitly delegate 
authority to administrative agencies, there are clearly some powers that 
it would be improper for Congress to delegate in such an opaque way.124 
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The power to disturb the authority of the states in an area where state 
law is historically dominant, such as insurance regulation, is probably 
one such power.125 Given that federalism and “dual-sovereignty” are ba-
sic features of our nation’s political order, courts are justified in expect-
ing Congress to speak clearly when altering the balance of federal and 
state power.126 
 Withholding deference in such cases would ensure that courts can 
both keep agencies within the boundaries of delegated authority and 
prevent agencies from encroaching on powers historically reserved to 
the states.127 Limiting deference is more likely to prevent a concentra-
tion of power at the federal level than leaving such determinations to 
the discretion of federal agencies.128 
 Third, the court’s reading of section 2(b) of the 1933 Act left it 
unclear when the SEC must engage in a cost-benefit analysis.129 To be 
sure, the court deftly interpreted 2(b) to require the SEC to justify the 
costs of a “dual regulatory system” by explaining how new federal re-
quirements would actually enhance efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation beyond the levels provided for by existing state regulation.130 
This reading of the statutory requirement responds well to the specific 
harms posed by Rule 151A.131 Because the rule duplicates existing state 
regulations, it could drive up costs for businesses and consumers, but 
provide no new benefits.132 
 The court’s reading of section 2(b)’s mandate, however, may only 
incentivize the SEC to forgo a 2(b) analysis altogether.133 The SEC in 
fact argued that a cost-benefit analysis was unnecessary on the ground 
that 2(b) does not apply to agency rules that merely define or interpret 
the statute’s terms.134 The court responded that it had no power to dis-
regard a flawed 2(b) analysis once the SEC had undertaken one.135 The 
implications for future agency action seem clear: so long as the SEC is 
merely defining statutory terms, it might forgo any analysis of the mar-
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ginal costs and benefits of its measures and still expect to receive defer-
ence from the courts.136 The court would have strengthened its opin-
ion by making clear that the SEC must provide a cost-benefit analysis 
even when a new rule appears in the form of statutory interpr
Conclusion 
 In American Equity, the D.C. Circuit accorded Chevron deference to 
the SEC’s Rule 151A, endorsing an expansive view of the agency’s au-
thority to regulate in an area historically reserved to the states. The 
court did not see fit to take a less deferential approach in light of the 
potential threat posed to state autonomy. The court vacated Rule 151A, 
however, due to the SEC’s flawed analysis of the rule’s effects on effi-
ciency, competition, and capital formation. The SEC failed to demon-
strate that the rule’s costs were justified by new benefits beyond those 
already provided by state regulation. In the future, the SEC might be 
able to avoid the obligation to engage in a cost-benefit analysis
utory terms. 
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